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The primary purpose of this lecture is to make a case for an integrated and 
effective population policy in Pakistan. An effective population policy is critical in 
its own right. It is also essential for maximising the positive outcome of all of 
Pakistan’s development efforts. Despite some very modest progress, the overall 
population growth rate is still so high that it warrants serious concern. Among the 
top ten contributors to world population growth during 1995–2000, Pakistan stood 
third in absolute number, and was Number One in rate of growth. The average total 
fertility rate per woman of 5.2 in Pakistan, as compared to 2.4 in Indonesia, 2.9 in 
Iran, and 3.1 in India, is indeed problematic and requires an appropriate policy 
response. 
A broader view of population growth and economic development is suggested 
instead of a narrow family planning focus. Thus family planning programmes 
(supply-side) would be effective only when the population at large has the desire or 
motivation for smaller families (demand-side). It is shown that the demand-side of 
the equation is influenced by a host of social, cultural, religious, educational, and 
other factors. For purposes of this paper, all these are taken together and termed the 
knowledge factor. It is suggested that a successful population policy must have a 
clear focus on increasing the knowledge factor in the country through education and 
advocacy. 
Based on the policy experiences of other developing countries and the recent 
demographic realities in Pakistan, an effective population policy must address the 
following three objectives: (a) reduction in the rate and incidence of unwanted 
fertility; (b) reduction in demand for large-size families; and (c) greater investment 
in adolescents to tackle the population momentum problem. The lecture concludes 
that Pakistan still has a population problem that it must deal with by a 
comprehensive and effective population programme. Failure to do so would magnify 
the current problems which are a result of previous policy neglect. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a modest attempt at understanding the importance of 
population growth and its relationship to economic development in Pakistan. A 
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summary of the recent approaches to economic development is provided at the 
outset. Population growth is discussed with a view to understanding the 
economic and socio-cultural determinants of fertility behaviour. This is based on 
the experience of other developing countries. The issues of unwanted fertility, 
demand for large family size and population momentum are discussed in the 
context of Pakistan’s past population growth and the potential demographic 
changes in the future. 
The basic message here is a simple one: Pakistan’s experience with population 
issues and economic development has been a case of many missed opportunities and 
its deteriorating economic performance in the 1990s poses serious impediments for 
the future outlook and a daunting challenge to the leadership. It is argued that an 
integrated population policy is critical in its own right but is also essential for 
maximising the positive outcome of whatever development efforts are contemplated. 




“In the midst of this age of plenty, the standard of living for much 
of the world is declining, their poverty and economic backwardness 
are increasing, and their share of the world’s population is growing. 
In the world community of nations, the  rich  are  getting  richer    
while the poor are getting poorer… First among causes is the rapid, 
over whelming and utterly unprecedented world population 
explosion”. 
 
The above statement was made by John F. Kennedy in 1958 when he was a 
junior senator [Facing the Future (1998), p. 1]. At that time, world population was 
less than 3 billion, the income gap between rich and poor nations was about 30 to 
1. Now the population has doubled and so has this gap moved to 60 to 1. More 
than 40 years later, the following quote sums up the current situation [Earth 
Summit (2002), p. 6]. 
“Despite decades of development efforts, both the gap between rich 
and poor nations and the inequalities within nations have widened. 
Serious economic, social, gender and other inequities persist and 
hamper efforts to improve the quality of life for hundreds of millions of 
people. The number of people living in poverty stands at approximately 
1 billion and continues to mount”.  Population Policy 
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The early post World War II view of development primarily in terms of 
economic growth and increase in per capita income was gradually replaced over the 
last few decades with a broader view of development. This view in its simplest form 
places greater emphasis on the reduction or elimination of poverty, inequality, and 
unemployment within the context of a growing economy. Dudley Seers saw the 
meaning of development as [Seers (1969), p. 3]: 
“The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: 
What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to 
unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three 
have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a 
period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these 
central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, 
it would be strange to call the result ‘development’ even if per capita 
income doubled”. 
The experience of many developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s, 
including Pakistan, proved Seers correct. High growth rates and rising per capita 
income did not show much improvement in other measures. In some cases there was 
an actual decline in employment, equality and the real incomes of the lower 40 
percent of the population. 
In the 1990s the momentum towards this broader view continued and was also 
recognised by the World Bank whose policies in 1980s were clearly focused on 
economic growth as the goal of development. This new found broader perspective of 
the World Bank is illustrated in their statement in 1991 World Development Report 
(p. 4). 
“The Challenge of development… is to improve the quality of life. 
Especially in the world’s poor countries, a better quality of life 
generally calls for higher incomes—but it involves much more. It 
encompasses as ends in themselves better education, higher standards 
of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more 
equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer 
cultural life”. 
In these terms economic growth is a necessary condition for development 
but not sufficient unless one incorporates the human development factors. It is 
argued that improvements in education, for example, would also contribute 
towards growth through increase in human capital [Klasen (1999) and Jones 
(1999)]. 
Pakistan’s experience with economic growth and almost all development 
indicators, particularly over the last fifteen years, has been disappointing. From Fakhari A. Siddiqui 
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the 1960s to 1985, Pakistan experienced respectable economic growth rates 
averaging above 6  percent with a reduction in poverty. Since the early 1990s, 
the growth rate declined to less than 4 percent and population growth continued 
at a rate of over 2.5 percent, resulting in a per capita income increase of just over 
1 percent. The positive and high economic growth of the 1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s was driven primarily by external factors of aid, remittances and green 
revolution technology without due attention paid to reforming the domestic 
climate for growth. As the inward inflow of aid and remittances began to dry up 
since the late 1980s along with the maturation of the green revolution, growth 
also declined [Stern (2001)]. 
Failure to undertake the necessary reform in the socio-economic and 
political arena led not only to slowing economic growth, but aggravated the human 
development indicators such as poverty, literacy rate, school enrollment, and 
gender equality, as well as continued high fertility. The lesson from this experience 
is that economic growth is not sustainable without due regard to education, gender 
equality, poverty reduction, good governance and other social development 
indicators. These factors are important in and of themselves for economic 
development but they are equally important for a positive investment climate 
which drives economic growth. A comparison of Pakistan and India during the 
1990s provides a good example. 
In the 1980s Pakistan’s growth rate was higher than India’s. Since the 
1990s India’s growth rate has been almost twice (6 percent) that of Pakistan (3.7 
percent). 
“What made India’s rapid growth possible was a reform programme 
that increased openness and competitiveness while improving major 
elements of its investment climate. India also took steps to increase the 
inclusiveness of growth, by expanding education, including education 
of girls. As a result, India’s literacy rate has risen over the past decade, 
with significant increase in the female literacy rate… and yet Pakistan 
has failed to take similar steps to overcome those problems”. [Stern 
(2001)]. 
Unlike the policies of the past, explicit integration of populations into 
economic and development policies is a necessary prerequisite for development and 
poverty alleviation. These further reinforce achievement of population objectives as 
well as the improved quality of life of the population. 
 
POPULATION GROWTH 
The debate on population growth is not new. It was the Malthusian 
population trap that gave economics its name as a “dismal science”.  Malthus’ Population Policy 
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dismal outlook for the future of mankind was based on the basic principle of 
diminishing returns when one considers the land-labour ratios where increasing 
population to fixed land would eventually result in a chronic low level standard 
of living. His contention was that the only way to avoid such a fate was to 
practice “moral restraint” thereby limiting the number of births. Some might, 
therefore, consider Malthus as the father of the birth control movement. 
The Malthusian population trap model is a simple and crude theory of the 
relationship between economic progress and population growth. As a theory it is 
subject to serious criticism on analytic and empirical grounds. Analytically, its 
failure to account for technical change over time and the assumption of the 
relationship of increased population growth and national income are unacceptable 
given the long run historical experience of advanced economies and in light of the 
more recent cases of many developing countries. 
The evidence on the relationship between the fertility rate and per capita 
income in aggregate in developing countries is not supportive of this model. 
Fertility rates varied between 2.5 and over 7.0 with an average per capita 
income of under $1000. This demonstrates that per capita income fails to 
explain variations in population growth. Household income, or the distribution 
of income may be better predictors of population growth [Todaro (2001)]. See 
Fig.1. 
A microeconomic approach by economists uses the application of standard 
consumer behaviour models (utility maximisation) by explicitly recognising 
desired number of children as a rational economic response relative to other 
goods. Such utility maximising economic models of fertility explain fertility 
behaviour in advanced economies and with some modifications can provide a 
good guide for developing countries too. The issue can be simplified by asking 
whether the people in the developing countries respond to changes in price or 
cost of children in the same manner as in advanced countries. For example, when 
these costs rise (opportunity costs) as a result of increased educational and 
employment opportunities for women or rise in school fees etc., and if parents 
respond by reducing their desire for more children, then one would accept such a 
model. Empirical evidence, though not conclusive, from a number of 
international studies support the basic premise of such models. The works of 
Schultz (1974); Birdsall (1988) and Dasgupta (1995) among others, are some of 
the examples of such an approach providing empirical evidence. Lant Pritchett 
(1994) offers strong empirical evidence that low fertility is determined mostly by 
economic, social, cultural, and educational improvements in a population and 
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The above is a brief account of the possible explanations or determinants of 
population growth. Like anything else in development economics, the relative 
importance of each of these many factors may vary from country to country. 
Nevertheless it offers a good guide for a country specific analysis and some 
implications for development and fertility. A simple implication is that family 
planning programmes (supply side) would be effective only when the population at 
large has the desire or motivation (demand side) for smaller families. This demand-
side is determined by a host of economic, social, cultural, educational and other 
factors. It is important to note that many of these factors are not only important in 
understanding fertility behaviour (population growth) but are equally significant 
determinants of economic development. Thus the linkage between population growth 
and development. 
The existence of this linkage is generally accepted, but the precise nature or 
causal direction between the two is a subject of continuing debate. The questions 
such as, ‘Does population growth cause poverty?’ or ‘Does poverty cause population 
growth?’ must be addressed in formulating effective population policy as well as 
development programme strategies. One aspect of this debate involves the opposing 
views of the North and South particularly when the population growth and 
environmental concerns are added to the equation. An excellent survey of this debate 
is provided by Najam (2001) in a recent paper. Important and interesting as some 
dimension of this broader debate may be, it is beyond the scope and the main 
purpose of this paper. The questions that are relevant for this paper, deal with the 
impact and importance of population growth to economic development in Pakistan, 
where population growth has been and continues to pose a serious problem along 
with other adverse development indicators Population Growth in Pakistan. (See 
Table 4.) 
The overall record of Pakistan in terms of the usual population issues, both in 
absolute and relative terms, is a matter that deserves serious attention and analysis. 
Since Pakistan’s inception, it has distinguished itself by a rapid rate of growth of its 
population. In 1950 it ranked the 13th largest country by population size but 
graduated to the 7th ranked country by 1996 and according to one UN projection will 
become the 3rd most populated country (after India and China) by the middle of this 
century if the recent growth is maintained (Table 1). 
Among the projected top ten contributors to world population growth during 
1995–2000, Pakistan stood third in absolute numbers and number one in rate of 
growth (Table 2). It is important to note that statistics provided here, and the 
projections derived from these numbers indicate a rate of growth of population in 
Pakistan to be 300 percent faster than China and 170 percent faster than India. Some 
would argue that in light of Pakistan’s 1998 census, my numbers are over estimates. 
Regardless  of  statistical  discrepancy,  the point is that whatever set of numbers, are  Table 1 
The 13 Largest Countries Ranked According to Population Size* 
1950 1996 2050 
Rank Country  Population 
(Million) 
Rank Country  Population 
(Million) 
Rank Country Population 
(Million) 
1 China  555  1 China  1,232  1  India  1,533 
2 India  358  2  India  945  2  China  1,517 
3 U.S.A.  158  3 U.S.A.  269  3  Pakistan  357 
4 Russian   
Federation 
102 4  Indonesia 200  4  U.S.A. 348 
5 Japan  84  5 Brazil  161  5 Nigeria  339 
6 Indonesia  80  6  Russian 
Federation 
148 6  Indonesia  318 
7 Germany  68  7  Pakistan  140 7  Brazil 243 
8 Brazil  54  8 Japan  125  8  Bangladesh 218 
9 United   
Kingdom 
51 9  Bangladesh  120 9  Ethiopia  213 
10 Italy  47  10 Nigeria  115  10  Iran  170 
11 France  42  11 Mexico  93  11  Zaire  165 
12 Bangladesh  42  12  Germany  82  12  Mexico  154 
13  Pakistan  40  13 Viet  Nam  75  13 Philippines  131 
Source: United Nations, Population Division, Popin Web Site, p.1, 1998. 
 













1 India  15,999  20.6  20.6 
2 China  11,408  14.7  35.3 
3  Pakistan  4,048  5.2  40.5 
4 Indonesia  2,929  3.8  44.2 
5 Nigeria  2,511  3.2  47.5 
6 U.S.A.  2,267  2.9  50.4 
7 Brazil  2,154  2.8  53.1 
8 Bangladesh  2,108  2.7  55.9 
9 Mexico  1,547  2.0  57.9 
10 Philippines  1,522  2.0  59.8 
 Sub-total  46,494  59.8  59.8 
 World  total  77,738  100  100 
Source: United Nations, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision, 
(forthcoming). 
 
used, in both absolute and relative terms, Pakistan’s population growth rate is still 
higher than desired by any definition. This is not to say that no progress has been 
made towards reducing the growth rate. What is significant is the fact that the current 
population growth rate is high (shown in Table 3), and so is the average total fertility 
rate per woman of 5.2 in Pakistan compared to 2.4 in Indonesia, 2.9 in Iran and 3.1 
in India. [Population Reports (1996), p. 1]. This necessitates urgent attention for a 
comprehensive population policy.  
An effective policy formulation has to be based on a thorough understanding 
of key determinants of population growth. Here one can draw on the experience of 
other countries, as well as to see if there are some special factors peculiar to the 
situation in Pakistan. Recent empirical evidence clearly shows that it is a 
combination of economic, social cultural (religious) and institutional factors which 
are important determinants of desired family size. Equally important are the related 
factors such as level of poverty, educational levels, gender equality and health 
services which interact in a complex manner to influence family size and population 
growth. [Todaro (2000).] 
The idea that fertility decline must be viewed beyond the narrow vision of 
family planning services and in conjunction with improvements in social and 
economic development has received wide acceptance since the 1994 ICPD at Cairo. 
The south Commission in its report, stressed similar views, well before ICPD, as 
stated in the following quote [South Commission (1990)]: Table 3 


















Total Fertility Rate 
per Women 
1.    Indonesia  214,840 1.3 272,911  20.8  7.2  2.4 
2.    Malaysia  23,639 2.0 31,326  24.4  4.4  3.1 
3.    Bangladesh  140,369 2.1 210,823  26.8  8.9  3.7 
4.  India  1,025,096  1.6  1,351,801  24.5  8.6  3.1 
5.    Iran  66,475 1.5 99,343  22.5  5.1  2.9 
6.    Pakistan  142,326 2.4 250,981  36.8  10.0  5.2 
Taken from UN Web Site: http://www.unescap.org/pop/data_sheet/2001/table2.htm. Table 4 






































China 1,253,567  0.9  16.0  7.1  1.8  25  37  620  2,604 
Japan  126,380  0.2 9.6  7.1  1.4 15  4  39,640  21,581 
South Korea  46,444  0.8  14.9  6.4  1.7  22  9  9,700  10,656 
Indonesia 204,336  1.4  21.8  7.8  2.5  31  49 980  3,740 
Malaysia 22,174  2.3  25.8  4.5  3.3  36  11  3,890  8,865 
Bangladesh 124,178  1.6  26.8  9.6  3.1 38  77  240  1,331 
India 974,912  1.6  25.0  9.0  3.0  34  71  340  1,348 
Iran 63,471  1.5  21.0  6.0  3.1  40  39  1,648  5,768 
Pakistan  141,680  2.7 
a  35.8  7.7  5.0  42  73  460  2,154 
Turkey 64,747  1.5  21.7  6.5  2.5  29  43  2,780  5,193 
Avg. for 
the group  302,189  1.45  21.8  7.17  2.7  30.7  45.7  6,030  6,324 
Source: *UN, ESCAP DATASHEET (1998). UNDP, Popin Website. 
aThis is the figure quoted, Actual difference between crude birth and death rates gives a higher rate of 2.8. 
**UNDP, Human Development Index, 1997. Fakhari A. Siddiqui 
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“While family planning measures are vitally necessary, they are more 
effective as security and living standards improve. Poverty must be eradicated, for 
only then will it be possible to create the conditions in which people are more likely 
to see virtue in smaller families”. 
Pakistan’s renowned development economist, late Mahbub-ul-Haq vigorously 
expressed this view that the solution to the problem of population is to be found in 
the solution to the problem of poverty. In his view,  
“Population growth is a developmental issue, not a clinical problem. 
No one denies today that top priority must be given to reducing high 
rates of population growth in the developing world. The differences are 
on strategies, not on objectives. Family planning must be regarded as 
an integral part of new models of sustainable human development. 
Divorced from such development models, and pursued as condom-
distribution programmes with single-minded zeal to meet ‘unmet 
demand’ they will fail… We cannot slip a condom on poverty.” (1994.) 
The implications of this broader view of population growth and economic 
development are indeed far reaching. In terms of policy formulation it is imperative 
to interpret this carefully and precisely. Otherwise the temptation might be to ignore 
the population problem until, for example, the poverty question is resolved. It is true 
that the experience of advanced countries clearly demonstrates that economic 
improvement took care of the population growth problem and now in many western 
countries the problem is too low birth rates. Similarly there is clear evidence that 
despite continuing poverty, India and Bangladesh have experienced a much lower 
population growth rate than Pakistan. 
It is, therefore, a question of an appropriate population policy that would also 
help simultaneously economic development objectives. This requires a closer look at 
the demographic dynamics by decomposing aggregate population growth rates. 
 
POPULATION DYNAMICS 
The overall population growth rate can be decomposed into three components:  
(a) unwanted fertility (unmet need), (b) high desired family size, and (c) population 
momentum. Population momentum refers to the tendency of population to continue 
growing after the replacement-level-fertility has been achieved due to a large 
proportion of young persons in the population. 
A recent Population Council and Overseas Development Council Conference 
report provides an excellent source of material on this issue. In addressing global 
population growth, they report that,  
“Disaggregated projections of global population growth show that 
population momentum alone will account for an increase in less Population Policy 
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developed countries from 4.5 billion (1995 level) to 7.3 billion, by the 
year 2100; high desired fertility will raise the total an additional one 
billion to 8.3 billion; and unwanted fertility will increase it to 10.2 
billion. By the year 2040, virtually all of the global population growth 
could be due to momentum alone.” [Population Council (1998), p. 3] 
Such a disaggregation exercise is important for better understanding of 
population growth issues. To the degree that the composition of population growth 
can vary substantially across countries and overtime for a given country, specific 
evaluation of different components is of vital importance. For example, in India, the 
Philippines, and Kenya the population momentum alone will account for 61 percent, 
66 percent and 68 percent of the future growth respectively. In the case of Sub-
Sahara Africa, this factor’s contribution to the future growth is less than 50 percent 
and the most significant factor remains high desired family size. Thus a given policy 
for India will not be appropriate for Sub-Sahara Africa. One must therefore avoid 
“one-size fits all” approaches in dealing with population growth issues. 
The following discussion examines each of the three components with respect 
to their relative importance and some suggested policy responses for Pakistan. 
 
Unwanted Fertility 
A measure of unwanted fertility is an important dimension of population 
growth in many developing countries. It is a good indicator of the gap between 
desired family size and the actual size. The size of the gap equals unmet need and is 
determined by a host of socio-economic factors and is usually estimated through 
surveys of women of childbearing age. For example, in Population Report (1996), 
the total for the developing countries was estimated to be 100 million women who 
had unmet needs. According to this source, the unmet need for Pakistan was 5.7 
million, 31 million for India, 4.4 million for Bangladesh and Indonesia and 3.9 for 
Nigeria [Population Reports (1996), p. 1]: 
If 5.7 million women had an unmet need for contraception in the 1990s, and 
assuming this number has been reduced considerably since then, to say 4 million, it 
is still a very significant indicator for the potential to reduce this component of 
fertility. Even if 50 percent of this group ends up with one unwanted child born it 
would add 2 million more to the population. 
An appropriate policy response to deal with this problem must be based on the 
reasons for not using contraception, despite expressed desire. Table 5, lists the 
relative importance of some of the factors. It is worth noting that neither availability 
nor expense were prominent reasons. Husband’s preferences, religious reasons and 
lack of knowledge were the main motives. In light of this, it is obvious that the 
simple supply side response (i.e. family planning services) would prove ineffective 




Distribution of Ever Married Women Who Are Non-users of Contraception* 
by Reason for Never Using Contraception by Expenditure Quintile 
  First Quintile  Second Quintile Fifth  Quintile Overall 
Husbands Prefer Not to  38.9  38.8  30.9  35.6 
Bad Side Effects  4.5  9.6  8.5  7.0 
Expensive 5.9  6.0  1.7  4.3 
Not Available  0.6  4.6  3.1  3.1 
Did not Know Enough  18.7  10.3  9.8  12.6 
Ineffective Methods  4.3  0.5  3.6  2.3 
Religious Reasons  18.9  17.0  16.9  17.7 
Husband Ill or Away  2.1  4.1  2.7  2.3 
Other   5.9  8.2  22.8  14.9 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: World Bank tabulations from PIHS (1991). (Reproduced from Pakistan 2010, 1997). 
           * Excluding those who state they wanted more children. 
 
This task is neither easy nor simple as ultimately it would require reducing the 
impact of all such forces which in their totality act as a wall of resistance toward 
adopting reproductive behaviour conducive to lowering fertility. For lack of a better 
term, we can denote all these forces taken together as the knowledge factor which 
may be conceived as an index.
1 These three factors: husband’s preferences, religious 
reasons, and lack of contraception knowledge can be measured in terms of this index. 
In these terms, education defined in broad terms, is the answer as it would raise the 
numerical value of this index. The impact of religion and the role of religious leaders 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
High Desired Family Size 
High desired family size still remains an important component of the 
population growth in Pakistan. It too is determined by socio-economic factors. 
Conceptually, and based on the historic experience of advanced countries, this can be 
completely eliminated over time. Developing Islamic countries, like Bangladesh, 
Iran and Indonesia have successfully reduced their total fertility rates to 3.1, 2.8 and 
2.6 respectively, compared to Pakistan where it is still about 5. How can this be 
explained? In addition to the generally accepted socio-economic determinants of 
high fertility, it can be argued that in the case of Pakistan the high desired family size 
might be explained in terms of lack of effective action to enhance the knowledge 
factor. 
The knowledge factor in Pakistan manifests itself as a result of the complex 
interacting forces of strong conservative traditions, the role of woman, the level of 
 
1Conceptually, such an index can be viewed as similar to the Human Development Index. Population Policy 
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poverty, the level of education and the perceived notions of religious dictates 
regarding reproductive behaviour. The relative sustained strength of these factors in 
Pakistan, in contrast to say Iran, is partly a reflection of a failure of effective 
population policy due to the lack of strong commitment on the part of (i) political 
leadership, (ii) religious leadership, (iii) intellectual leadership, and (iv) neglect of 
women’s education. These four factors alone stand out in Iranian experience as 
instruments of significant fertility reduction and offer a good example for Pakistan to 
follow [Aghajanian (1995)]. 
In the western media, Iran has been viewed as an Islamic extremist state 
where the government itself is dominated by religious leaders. It offers an excellent 
example of the power of state in both increasing and reducing fertility. After the 
1979 revolution, Iran’s rulers urged Iranians to produce more children and they 
lowered the legal age of marriage to nine. The response was an unprecedented 
natural increase in population growth of 3.9 percent, the highest ever recorded. Then 
in 1989, there was a complete turn around and new population stabilisation efforts 
and promotion of reproductive health received top priority with the blessings of the 
religious leaders. The policies were so successful that population growth rates 
declined to 1.4 percent and Iran was the proud recipient of the UN Population Award 
in 1999. 
Aghajanian and Mehryar (1999) provide an interesting and useful analysis of 
the fertility transition experience of Iran. The statistics in Table 6 are indicative of an 
impressive decline in the population growth rate, total fertility rate and age at 
marriage. The positive improvements were particularity significant in the 1990s 
when the population stabilisation policies were actively pursued with full support of 
religious  leadership  and  a strong and sustained commitment of government leaders. 
 
Table 6 


























1966 25-7  3.1  45.0  52.0 46.5  86.6   
1976 33.7  2.7  32.7  49.1 78.6  78.6  63 
1986 49.4
a  3.8
b  37.5 50.7  33.5  76.6  7.0 
1991 55.8  2.5  34.8  45.2 25.5  67.1  5.5 
1996 60.1  1.5  25.1  33.1 18.6  66.7  3.4 
*Derived from Aghajanian Mehryar (1999). 
aIncludes 1.8 million Afghan refugees. 
bExcluding Afghan refugees. Fakhari A. Siddiqui 
 
360
Additional factors which were also significant include expansion of the network of 
rural health workers (behvars), dramatic increase in school enrollment of the female 
population (from 54.7 percent to 83.2 percent for 10-14 age from 1976 to 1995), and 
substantial progress in the female literacy rate (by 1996, over 80 percent of woman 
age 15-29 were literate). 
The Iranian experience of unprecedented decline in total fertility from 8.4 
children to 4.6 children per woman (a 45 percent decline) during a period of only 10 
years is explained by two group of factors [Aghajanian and Mehryar (1999), p. 12] 
“One group includes all the changes which led to the socio-structural 
precursors for fertility decline and motivation for a smaller family 
size. The other group of factors include direct policy changes by the 
government regarding population and birth control during this 
period”. 
The first group of these factors were mainly reduced infant mortality (through 
a better network of health workers), increased female enrollment in schools with the 
accompanying prevalence of working outside the home and economic factors such as 
the increased costs of raising children and increased costs of marriage (which led to a 
higher age of marriage). The importance of the governmental and the religious 
leadership role is best summed up by the authors (p. 11). 
“It is clear that family planning within a sound reproductive health 
policy can be acceptable and supported and encouraged by religious 
and political leaders in a Muslim country… Once the educated 
technocrats described the issue of rapid population growth and the 
problems faced by the government, the religious leaders gave their 
complete support. In any Muslim country, interaction between religious 
leaders and government technocrats must be considered a vital part of 
programme implementation. Such interaction brings about political 
expressions by the clergy and religious politicians and creates an 
environment of acceptability among the common people with respect to 
the issues of birth control and family size limitations. Such a supportive 
environment makes the idea of smaller family size legitimate and 
acceptable for couples of all classes and all areas”. 
 
Population Momentum 
This component of population growth is very significant for Pakistan as it has 
a very large (over 40 percent) proportion of its population under age 15. Even if the 
country achieves a fertility rate equaling replacement level, the population will 
continue to grow because of the large size of these young age cohorts. A look at the 




Fig. 2.  Population Pyramid for Pakistan. 
 
of this component for potential population growth. Since the size of this group is 
known, simple extrapolation into the future, holding the current socio-economic 
determinants constant, provides a scary scenario of population growth. By the same 
token, it points to the urgency to devise an appropriate set of population and 
development policies to minimise this potential growth. 
Addressing the population momentum problem may require delaying the age 
at marriage and childbearing and promoting birth spacing through expanding 
education and improving women’s socio-economic opportunities. Here again, Iran’s 
example is a good model. Delay in age at marriage is a powerful instrument. For 
example, in the case of Bangladesh it is estimated that by year 2100 its population 
will be 253 million. Momentum alone will produce a population of 244 million, but 
his number will be 223 million and 206 million if the median age of marriage is 
delayed by 2.5 year and 5 years respectively [Population Council (1998), p. 5]. 
The age at marriage in Pakistan is considerably lower in comparison to other 
countries with similar socio-economic indicators. In a recent study [Mahmood (2001)], 
it is shown that (i) the median age at marriage is 18.3, (ii) education of women is the 
only factor contributing to an increase in age at marriage (age at marriage with 
secondary education is 22 years vs. 17.7 with no education) and (iii) the socio-
economic norm of marrying early is still strong and prevalent in Pakistan. Commenting 
on teenage mothers the authors state, “A substantial proportion of women get married 
during adolescence (13–20 years) and are under social pressure to produce an 
offspring”… over 10 percent of the teenaged females have begun childbearing (p. 7). 
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This rather high incidence of marriage at a younger age, combined with the 
reality that 12.9 million females are aged 15–49 (46 percent of the total 28 million 
females), creates a need for serious attention to the population momentum problem. 
 
POPULATION POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Despite the onset of demographic transition since the late 1990s, Pakistan still 
faces serious population problems, as the previous discussion has outlined. The 
adverse consequences of population effects on other development efforts (i.e. 
poverty, education, gender inequality, health and nutrition standards etc.) are 
obvious. Equally obvious is, therefore, the need for an effective population policy. It 
is suggested here that such a policy must be assigned a top priority in the overall 
development plans of the country. The point that a rapidly growing population is 
both a challenge and a constraint to development prospects in Pakistan was 
addressed in an earlier paper and a plea was made for action on the policy front 
[Siddiqui (1998)]. 
Based on the policy experiences of other developing countries and the recent 
demographic realities in Pakistan, an effective population policy must address the 
following three objectives: 
1.  Reduction in the rate and incidence of unwanted fertility. 
2.  Reduction in demand for large size families. 
3.  Greater investment in adolescents. 
The issue of unwanted fertility and low level usage of contraception in 
Pakistan is well known and documented [Bongaart Bruce (1995); Casterline, et al. 
(2001); Mahmood (1992, 1996); Hashmi, et al. (1993); Robey, et al. (1996)]. These 
studies provide evidence of a considerable gap between stated fertility preference 
and reported contraception behaviour. The size of the gap indicates latent demand for 
contraception use. The larger the gap (unmet need) the greater is the potential 
positive benefits from programme improvements for any given set of socio-cultural 
determinants. The real increase in contraceptive use would require changes in the 
socio-cultural determinants. For example, women with expressed desire for fewer 
children might be prevented to achieve this desire due to husbands’ preferences, 
religious reasons, lack of knowledge, or health reasons rather than access to family 
planning services. Thus, policy and programme initiatives, which reduce these 
barriers to contraceptive use are vital. In other words the specific objective of 
increased contraceptive usage requires increasing the knowledge factor. To increase 
the  knowledge  factor requires broader policy approaches dealing with formal 
education as well as advocacy. 
The second goal, of reducing demand for high family size is still very 
important in the Pakistani context. If the goal is two surviving children, policy 
options would require creation of conditions for small families. The population Population Policy 
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policy component may deal with advocacy issues, but the greatest long term success 
will be the result of better education, improving the status of women and general 
economic improvement of the poor. Here again, the importance of the knowledge 
factor is obvious, particularly when we consider the population growth, economic 
growth and human development linkages. [Ranis, et al. (2000)]. 
The third goal of investment in adolescents is an essential component of any 
policy formulation considering the impact of population momentum problem faced 
by Pakistan with over 40 percent of its current population being so young. Not only 
does this group impose tremendous dependency costs today, but failure to invest in 
their education or knowledge factor would make the problem worse in the future. 
Consequences of a successful policy would result in: (i) delay in age at marriage, (ii) 
reduction in size of family, and (iii) increased contraception usage. 
Despite the existence of a family planning programme since 1965, Pakistan 
has never really had an effective population policy. As a result, this small country 
now has a population of over 140 million of whom over 40 million live in utter 
poverty. Even under the most optimistic future population growth scenario it will end 
up with a population of over 213 million by year 2025 (assuming a growth rate of 1.5 
percent during 2010–2020 and only 1 percent from 2020 onwards). 
A meaningful policy starts with a sound concept and is based on recognition 
of the problem. Most importantly, its success demands strong leadership, 
commitment and courage, widespread support and adequate resources. Experience of 
countries like Iran, India, Egypt and Kenya indicate that political commitment 
resulted after a prolonged period of national debate. A national debate has yet to 
occur in Pakistan, which would provide the necessary strength to the leadership at all 
levels and would also be an important source of information to the people. Only 
through strong political commitment, strategies necessary for widespread support 
become feasible and the adequate flow of resource availability is ensured. 
Solid commitment by the leadership involves their thorough (i) understanding 
of the rationale for reducing population growth, and (ii) the legitimacy of the 
programmes used to reduce fertility. The contentious nature of the second issue may, 
at least, partially explain the lack of leadership as it arises from the particular socio-
economic and religious factors in Pakistan (i.e. low level of knowledge factor index). 
The value of the knowledge factor index will rise over time through 
improvements in education, particularly female education. But, in the short run, a 
good population policy can be a catalyst in its direct effect on increasing this index 
when religious leadership is part of the commitment. The role of religious leadership 
must be reevaluated so that instead of being a problem in reproductive behaviour it is 
an important part of the solution. The experience of Iran provides ample evidence of 
the importance of this issue and serves as a model for Pakistan. A well-conceived 
and implemented strategy of education and communication (IEC) must have 
religious leadership as a full and active partner to achieve the desired results in Fakhari A. Siddiqui 
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altering reproductive behaviour. The role and status of women and husbands’ 
preferences are two important determinants of contraceptive usages. Both are subject 
to religious beliefs. The positive attitude of religious leadership can and must play a 
significant role in this regard. 
The development agenda of Pakistan, according to the Planning Commission 
includes a ten point programme of poverty elimination. By year 2025, it aims to 
eliminate poverty, increase per capita income from Rs 24000 to Rs 69,000, male and 
female adult literacy rate of 100 percent, and to provide clean water, air and 
universal health care for all its citizens. It also mentions population growth rate of 1 
percent by year 2025. Of course many of these goals would positively impact 
fertility reduction. As a policy statement there is not even a mention of the need or 
role of population policy. Even under the most optimistic scenario, attainment of 
these goals would be problematic. Without an explicit and effective population 
policy, success on other fronts would indeed be extremely difficult. 
In conclusion, Pakistan still has a population problem that it must deal with by 
a comprehensive and effective population programme. Failure to do this would 
magnify the current problems which are a result of previous policy neglect. Some 
modest decline of recent fertility rates should not lull the leadership into 
complacency because the underlying population momentum continues to pose a real 
and significant problem. 
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Having been associated with the population field for over three decades and 
having seen the heyday of the issue in the 1960s and the 1970s, and the fatigue with 
which the subject is being dealt with in the 1980s and 1990s, does my heart good to 
see the subject put in perspective, in its relationship with human progress and 
development. Dr Fakhari’s paper highlights the need for strong inconsistent 
population policy in the context of elastic development in the country to get it out of 
debt trap the slowing economic growth and the escalating poverty. He has succinctly 
examined the determinants of high population growth and its linkages with poverty, 
inequality as well as social in economic engender inequality. His comments on the 
fact that increase in per capita income does not lead to a better quality of life in the 
majority of the people unless other social indicators such as health, literacy, gender 
inequalities and high fertility are addressed. It takes the case of economic growth of 
4 percent of Pakistan almost negated by the 2.5 percent population growth rate in the 
decades of 1990s. Drawing home the point that an inexplicit integration of 
population in the economic development policies is necessary for development and 
poverty elevation. He comments that population problem cannot be addressed only 
by the supply side of the population programme but must be a companied by a 
demand generation strategies by addressing the concerns of non-users such as 
perceived spousal disapproval, lack of the adequate knowledge regarding how and 
where of contraceptive delivery and perceived religious opposition. He sites success 
stories from Bangladesh, Indonesia and above all Iran, where they have a strong pro-
netalistic culture. The states sponsored a complete turn around toward population 
stabilisation and reproductive health lowering the growth rate from 3.92 to 1.4. 
Above all Imam Khomani’s ‘faatwa’ in support of family planning followed by 
enrolling the involvement of religious leaders and an element did we in Pakistan 
continued to sweep under the carpet except for some very successful NGOs 
initiatives. These are the examples for Pakistan to illuminate. Dr Fakhari’s 
demographic figures are not upto date as the rest of his presentation presumably 
because he is being out of the country for so long. He estimates TFR and PGR 5.2 
and 2.7 respectively against the latest NIPS study figures of 4.8 and 2.1. However, he 
is right on the mark when he points out that there is room for addressing the 
population momentum in Pakistan. Where approximately 60 percent of our 
population is below 25 and likely to really rock the demographic boat in the next 20 
years. Even if we succeed insignificantly lowing birth rate. Summing up the complex 
nature of the factors to confront debt growth and poverty alleviation, he stresses the Comments  367
need for an effective and consistent population policy by reducing unwanted fertility 
through culturally acceptable quality services reducing demand for large families by 
reducing IMR, CMR and MMR. And investment in adolescent through in attitudes 
formation in supports for the small family norms. The significant points brought out 
in his paper is the need for the strong and inconsistent population policy back by 
political commitment at the highest level. Factors which have frequently absent from 
our national agenda. A case in point being his reference to the Planning 
Commission’s 10 point programme of poverty elimination which does not include 
the population related issues. However, it is nice to be able to re-assure him that now 
at last there is an attempt to address development in holistic manner and the 
President his setup a task force for human development which focuses on basic 
health including reproductive health in family planning, basic education and income 
generation. Hopefully, as a result of this new inclusive development paradigm 
Pakistan will be able to successfully confront the issues of debt growth poverty and 
population exposure. 
 
Begum Surryia Jabeen 





First of all, I would like to appreciate Prof. Siddiqui’s motivation to write 
about Pakistan’s development concerns with a particular focus on population as an 
issue of special significance in the whole scenario. The debates and deliberations 
done on poverty, growth and development on this forum have rarely emphasised 
population growth as a frontline cause of the problem. In fact, population which lies 
at the core of all planning procedures and policy formulation is not given its due 
place in the national reform agenda.  
Turning my attention to the contents of the paper, I could not agree more with  
Prof. Siddiqui’s basic stance that Pakistan’s population growth needs to be reduced 
to maximise its development outcome. In this context, the paper addresses a whole 
spectrum of issues pertaining to population growth, economic development, poverty 
and their interlinkages. While making the argument for the importance of population 
policy in Pakistan’s development context, Prof. Siddiqui himself acknowledges the 
fact that the two have a cause and effect relationship and it is hard to determine 
whether population growth causes poverty or vice versa. He clearly contends that 
while family planning measures are necessary, poverty must be eradicated to create 
the conditions in which people are more likely to see virtue in having small families. 
Hence, with the limited financial resources that the country has at hand, the choice to 
prioritise poverty reduction strategies versus population growth reduction strategies 
remains a policy question. On the one hand, it is argued that social and economic 
conditions which constrain the use of family planning must be changed to generate 
more than a marginal decline in fertility. On the other hand, the emphasis on the 
provision and improvement of supplies of contraceptives is considered important for 
an increased and sustained use of family planning even with low levels of socio-
economic development. It is not clearly spelled out in the paper which strategy 
would be more rewarding to have a stronger impact on reducing population growth 
and improving the quality of life of the people, because both affect and reinforce 
each other. 
While reading through the paper, one tends to lose track of the argument made 
in the beginning that Pakistan’s population growth is the fore runner of social and 
economic problems, including poverty, unemployment, low education etc. The issue 
becomes more challenging when we consider that other countries with lower socio-
economic conditions and sustained poverty such as Bangladesh, Indonesia and India 
have successfully achieved high levels of contraceptive prevalence and decline in 
fertility. Given this, it is crucial to determine what policy prescriptions would be 
more effective in changing the fertility behaviour of Pakistani couples. The paper’s Comments  369
contents lack this analysis and the case made for a strong population policy for 
Pakistan remains inconclusive in this context. 
Moving away from the arguments of population and development 
interlinkages, the author then highlights population growth problem in Pakistan in 
terms of unwanted fertility, high-unmet need, high desired number of children and 
population momentum built in the age structure. There is no dispute that all these 
issues merit due attention from population policy perspective. Looking at the high 
unmet need in Pakistan, the demand for family planning services does not appear to 
be a problem. This demand needs to be simply matched with the supply side factors 
—an efficient service delivery system. Based on the situation analysis of these 
demographic issues, a case is made in the paper for an integrated and effective 
population policy for Pakistan. Yet the paper remains silent on interpreting what an 
effective and integrated policy would be? What have been the successes and failures 
in programme interventions and what effective approach would be more viable to 
have the desired outcome? 
If the thrust of the paper is on the importance of an effective population 
policy, there is a need to review the policy options and then link it with the situation 
at hand and the ground realities to justify the argument made in the beginning. In this 
context, I would like to mention that a paper on policy shifts and problems of their 
implementation was presented in another session on demographic issues which could 
provide some input for linking the population policy and programme performance 
issues. However, the basic message of the paper is clear and quite relevant for 
Pakistan’s population policy concerns. However, I feel that population issues and the 
illustration cited for other countries need to be reorganised in a systematic way to 
make a strong case for an effective population policy and programme for Pakistan. 
 
Naushin Mahmood 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 
Islamabad. 